Digital Commons @ George Fox University
Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay on
Reformed Epistemology

College of Christian Studies

1993

Alsontian Justification Revisited
Mark S. McLeod

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/rationality
Part of the Epistemology Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of
Religion Commons
Recommended Citation
McLeod, Mark S., "Alsontian Justification Revisited" (1993). Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay on Reformed Epistemology. Paper 7.
http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/rationality/7

This Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Christian Studies at Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay on Reformed Epistemology by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @
George Fox University.

[

4

]

Alstonian Justification Revisited

In Chapters 2 and 3 I presented an Alstonian version of the par
ity thesis as well as a challenge to it. I turn now to consider the
arguments of several of Alston's more recent essays. In particular I
concentrate on those aspects of his thought in which he delineates
his more considered account of epistemic justification as well as the
claim that one can be justified in believing that an epistemic prac
tice is reliable. My argument is that the claims of these later essays
on epistemic justification challenge those of the earlier, raising
again the question of the parity thesis: do sense perceptual beliefs
and the practice that generates them have the same epistemic status
as theistic beliefs and the practice that generates them?1

1. A warning is needed here. Alston's essays with which I deal in this chapter
make several terminological and substantive shifts from "Christian Experience and
Christian Belief." Although I believe the development of Alston's thought to be
quite consistent, with a clear and fundamentally unchanging understanding of epi
stemic justification and rationality, his use of terms and emphasis do change occa
sionally. I attempt to keep the shifts straight and to do so I introduce, by way of
suggestion, where I believe his terms and their references overlap. When it is not
clearly possible to do so, I note that and let Alston's usage stand while atttempting
to work around any unclarity to which so doing gives rise.
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Epistemic Justification Again

In "Concepts of Epistemic Justification" Alston delineates two
different kinds, and several subkinds, of epistemic justification.
The broad categories for that discussion are what he calls "deon
tological epistemic justification" and "evaluative epistemic justifica
tion":
Deontological Epistemic Justification (Jd): S is Jd in be
lieving that p if and only if in believing that p S is not
violating any epistemic obligations.
Evaluative Epistemic Justification Ue): S is Je in believing
that p if and only if S's believing that p, as S does, is a
good thing from the epistemic point of view.
The "as S does" in the second account is intended to call attention
to the particularity of this believing rather than believings of p un
der any conditions.
In a note, Alston points out that he was convinced by Alvin
Plantinga that "deontological, " rather than "normative, " is a more
accurate term for what Alston strives to describe in the first ac
count above. This suggests that his account of deontological justi
fication is an extension of the accounts of normative justification
provided in his earlier essay. To avoid bogging down in exegetical
arguments about shifts in terminology, I simply present Alston's
arguments in the new terminology. Thus, in the remainder of this
section I spell out in further detail Alston's accounts of ]d and Je,
and related issues, returning later to consider his explanation of
how a person can be justified in believing that an epistemic practice
is reliable.
Alston rejects the claim that ]d. or any version of it, is the best
understanding of justification from the epistemic point of view. To
understand the central point of Alston's argument against ]d, it is
best if we get before us what he takes to be the strongest candidate
from among the deontological competitors for epistemic justifica
tion. After rejecting a voluntarist account of ]d (because most of
our beliefs are not under our direct voluntary control), he suggests

Rationality and Theistic Belief
two possible accounts of an involuntarist ]d· 2 The first, where the
subscript "i" stands for "involuntary":
Involuntary ]d Od;): S is ]di in believing that p at t if and
only if there are no intellectual obligations that (1) have to
do with the kind of belief-forming or sustaining habit the
activation of which resulted in S' s believing that p at t, or
with the particular process of belief formation or suste
nance that was involved in S's believing that p at t, and
(2) which are such that (a) Shad those obligations prior to
t; (b) S did not fulfill those obligations; and (c) if S had
fulfilled those obligations, S would not have believed that
p at t.
The second is the same as the first, but (c) is replaced, for reasons I
leave up to the reader to fill in, by
(c') if S had fulfilled those obligations, then S's belief
forming habits would have changed, or S's access to rele
vant adverse considerations would have changed, in such
a way that S would not have believed that p at t.
Alston rejects the deontological understanding of epistemic justi
fication, for "Jdi does not give us what we expect . . . . The most
serious defect is that it does not hook up in the right way with an
adequate, truth-conducive ground. " In other words, "I may have
done what could reasonably be expected of me in the management
and cultivation of my doxastic life, and still hold a belief on outra
geously inadequate grounds. " There are several possible sources of
this discrepancy. One might have grown up in "cultural isolation, "
following the noetic leadership of the authorities of one's tribe and
not having any reasons to reject their authority as reliable. Yet the
tradition of the tribe might be very poor reason for believing that
p. Or one might be deficient in cognitive powers or have poor
training one lacks the time or resources to overcome. Alston
writes:
What this spread of cases brings out is that ]di is not sufficient for
epistemic justification; we may have done the best we can, or at
least the best that could reasonably be expected of us, and still be in
2. Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," pp. 89, 94, 95, 99·

Alstonian Justification Revisited
a very poor epistemic position in believing that p; we could, blame
lessly be believing p for outrageously bad reasons. Even though )di
is the closest we can come to a deontological concept of epistemic
justification if belief is not under direct voluntary control, it still
does not give us what we are looking for.
,

So Alston rejects deontological justification as the best understand
ing of epistemic justification; it falls short of what is wanted from
the epistemic point of view. 3
What account of Je does Alston give in "Concepts of Epistemic
Justification"? Here Je is an internalist notion with an externalist
constraint. Consider the internalist aspect first. There are, says Al
ston, two popular ideas about what internalism is. The first takes
justification to be internal in that "it depends on what support is
available for the belief from 'within the subject's perspective, ' in
the sense of what the subject knows or justifiably believes about
the world. " The second "takes the 'subject's perspective' to include
whatever is 'directly accessible' to the subject, accessible just on the
basis of reflection. " To these readings Alston adds a third that con
trasts with both as well as with reliabilist understandings of justi
fication: "What I take to be internal about justification is that
whether a belief is justified depends on what it is based on
(grounds); and grounds must be other psychological state(s) of the
same subject. " He continues: "So in taking it to be conceptually
true that one is justified in believing that p iff one's belief that p is
based on an adequate ground, I take justification to be 'internal' in
that it depends on the way in which the belief stems from the be
liever's psychological states, which are 'internal' to the subject in
an obvious sense. " So Je is an internalist notion. 4
In "lnternalism and Externalism in Epistemology" Alston fur
ther develops these notions, labeling the first "perspectival internalJ. Ibid. , pp. 95-96. See Alston, "The Deontological Concept of Epistemic
Justification," in Epistemic Justification (originally in Philosophical Perspectives 2
(1988]: 257-99), for an extended discussion of his rejection of deontological con
cepts of epistemic justification as the central notion of justification given the epi
stemic point of view.
4· Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," p. 107. This is in contrast to
Je as Alston describes it elsewhere. In "Christian Experience and Christian Belief,"
p. II5, he claims that Je might, when all the hard work is done, boil down to a
kind of reliabilist understanding of rationality. His more considered judgment does
not, however, ignore reliability, as the next few paragraphs delineate. See note 7
for more detail.
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ism" (PI) and the second "access internalism" (AI). 5 The relation
ship between the two, Alston says, is that "we can think of AI as a
broadening of PI. Whereas PI restricts justifiers to what the subject
already justifiably believes . . . AI enlarges that to include what the
subject can come to know just on reflection . . . . AI, we might say,
enlarges the conception of the subject's perspective to include not
only what does in fact occur in that perspective . . . but also what
could be there if the subject were to turn his attention to it. " Alston
has serious reservations about both PI and AI. He writes that
the only arguments of any substance that have been advanced [in
support of PI] proceed from a deontological conception ofjustifica
tion and inherit any disabilities that attach to that conception. In
deed, PI gains significant support only from the most restrictive
form of a direct voluntary control version of that conception, one
that is, at best, of limited application to our beliefs. As for AI, the
arguments in the literature that are designed to establish a direct
recognizability version [the strongest version where the justifier is
said to be directly recognizable iff S needs only to reflect clear
headedly on the question of whether or not the (justifying) fact ob
tains in order to know that it does] markedly fail to do so!
Reservations notwithstanding, Alston believes that a moderate
version of AI can be supported, although along lines very different
from those he considers and rejects in "Internalism and External
ism in Epistemology . "7 This moderate version of AI is, I take it,
5· In "An Intemalist Externalism," p. 23 3 , Alston adds another type of inter
nalism, which he calls "consciousness internalism" (CI). CI, Alston argues, has
"the crushing disability that one can never complete the formulation of a sufficient
condition for justification. " But we need not concern ourselves with this version of
internalism here. Although Alston distances his own position in "Concepts of
Epistemic Justification" from both PI and AI, in "An lnternalist Externalism" and
in "lntemalism and Externalism in Epistemology" (also in Epistemic Justification;
originally in Philosophical Topics 14 [ 1986]: 179-221) he identifies his position with
a "moderate AI. "
6. Alston, "Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology, " pp. 214, 224.
7· In note 4 I called attention to a shift in Alston's description of Je from
"Christian Experience and Christian Belief' to "Concepts of Epistemic Justifica
tion." In the former essay, p. 115, he writes that "Sis justified in the evaluative
sense in holding a certain belief provided that the relevant circumstances in which
that belief is held are such that the belief is at least likely to be true. In other terms,
being Jc requires that in the class of actual and possible cases in which beliefs like
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a recast understanding of the third account of internalism Alston
notes in "Concepts of Epistemic Justification"-the account mak
ing reference to grounds and psychological states. In the moderate
version of AI, the accessibility of the states that justify beliefs must
not be so demanding as to be unrealistic or so weak as to include
too much:
What is needed here is a concept of something like "fairly direct
accessibility." In order that justifiers be generally available for pre
sentation as the legitimizers of the belief, they must be fairly readily
available to the subject through some mode of access much quicker
than lengthy research, observation, or experimentation. It seems
reasonable to follow [Carl] Ginet's lead and suggest that to be a
justifier an item must be the sort of thing that, in general, a subject
can explicitly note the presence ofjust by sufficient reflection on his
situation.
Alston goes on to note that he does not know how to make this
notion more precise. He summarizes by saying that "to be a justi
fier of a belief, its ground must be the sort of thing whose instances
are fairly directly accessible to their subject on reflection. "8
Alston's defense of this internalist requirement comes as an at
tempt not to prove its necessity but rather to explain the presence
of the requirement. He says that the reason we have the concept of
"being justified" in holding a belief flows from the "practice of
critical reflection on our beliefs, of challenging their credentials and
responding to such challenges-in short the practice of attempting
that are or would be held in circumstances like that, the belief is usually true.
Much needs to be done to work out what kinds of circumstances are relevant, how
to generalize over beliefs, and so on. Pretending that all that has been done, I
would like to suggest that what this boils down to is that the way the belief was
formed and/or is sustained is a generally reliable one, one that can generally be
relied on to produce true rather than false beliefs. " He continues in a note, p. 133 ,
n. 4 : "And not just that the practice has a good track record up to now; rather it is
a lawlike truth that beliefs formed in accordance with that practice, in those kinds
of circumstances, are at least likely to be true." Although his more recent work
does not totally ignore reliabilist considerations, there is an addition to Alston's
reliabilist demands. Another way of reading these claims, of course, is that the
second account of Jc is not intended to be a development of the first. Perhaps,
however, there are too many similarities to make this interpretation likely.
8. Alston, "An Intemalist Externalism, " p. 238.
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to justify our beliefs. "9 Alston is clear that being justified and justi
fying are not the same thing and argues that the former concept
was developed in the context of a demand for the latter. Thus the
AI requirement we all have intuitively is a natural result of the
social practices in which we engage. Thus epistemic justification is
intemalist.
But it carries an extemalist constraint. In "Concepts of Epistemic
Justification" Alston's concern is to tie the notion of justification to
the notion of a truth-conducive ground. He writes that "what a
belief is based on we may term the ground of the belief. A ground,
in a more dispositional sense of the term, is the sort of item on
which a belief can be based. " Furthermore, "we want to leave open
at least the conceptual possibility of direct or immediate justification
by experience (and perhaps in other ways also), as well as indirect or
mediate justification by relation to other beliefs (inferentially in the
most explicit cases). Finally, to say that a subject has adequate
grounds for her belief that p is to say that she has other justified
beliefs, or experiences, on which the belief could be based and
which are strongly indicative of the truth of the belief. "10 So the
goodness of a belief from the epistemic point of view is its posses
sion of grounds of this type. Thus his final account of Je, where the
subscript "g" stands for "grounds":11
Grounds Je Oeg): S is ]eg in believing that p if and only if
S's believing that p, as S did, was a good thing from the
epistemic point of view, in that S's belief that p was based
on adequate grounds and S lacked sufficient overriding
reasons to the contrary.
How is this position extemalist? Alston distances ]eg from a
straightforwardly reliabilist account of justification. He says that
"it may be supposed that ]eg as we have explained it, is just re
liability of belief formation with an evaluative frosting. For where
a belief is based on adequate grounds that belief has been formed in
a reliable fashion. " But to take reliability as a criterion of justifica9· Ibid. , p. 236.
ro. Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification, " pp. Ioo- 101.
1 I. Ibid. , p. 1o6. In this context, a beliefs being "based on" another does not
imply inference; see Alston's discussion on pp. 99-100.
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tion, or simply to identify justification with reliability, would be
mistaken. The internalist character of justification blocks any such
move. Reliable belief formation may occur where the belief is
formed on some basis outside the believer's psychological states. In
fact, "I might be so constituted that beliefs about the weather to
morrow which apparently just 'pop into my mind' out of nowhere
are in fact reliably produced by a mechanism of which we know
nothing, and which does not involve the belief being based on any
thing. Here we would have reliably formed beliefs that are not
based on adequate grounds. "12 Since a belief could be reliably
formed but not be internal in the requisite sense, justification and
reliability are not the same thing. Nevertheless, there is a close
relationship between reliability and justification. Alston claims
"that the most adequate concept of epistemic justification is one
that will put a reliability constraint on principles of epistemic justi
fication. " He continues: "By a 'reliability constraint' I mean some
thing like this. Take a principle of justification of the form: 'If a
belief of type B is based on a ground of type G, then the belief is
justified.' This principle is acceptable only if forming a B on the
basis of a G is a reliable mode of belief formation. On this view, a
reliability claim is imbedded in every claim to justification. " Thus,
although reliability and justification are not the same thing, they
remain intimately connected. 13
This claim is further explicated and defended in "An Internalist
Externalism. " Although there are internalist considerations in what
the grounds for a belief are, Alston rejects the notion that there is
an internalist restriction on the adequacy (as opposed to the exis
tence) of grounds for believing. That the adequacy of the grounds
be internal is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for justi
fication. Taking necessity first, PI restrictions on adequacy run into
the difficulty of requiring an infinite hierarchy of justified beliefs,
for a PI necessary condition would claim something like "one is
justified in believing that p only if one knows or is justified in
believing that the ground of that belief is an adequate one. " Since
no one can fulfill this requirement without having to be justified on
12. Ibid. , pp. 108-9.
13. Alston, "Epistemic Circularity" (in Epistemic justification; originally in Philos
ophy and Phenomenological Research 47 [ 1986]: 1-30), pp. 321-22.
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every new level, a PI restriction cannot be a necessary one. On the
other hand, an AI restriction may be construed in this way: "S is
justified in believing that p only if S is capable, fairly readily on the
basis of reflection, to acquire a justified belief that the ground of S's
belief that p is an adequate one. " This fails to be necessary in that,
although it might be within human capacity to have such justifica
tion, "it is by no means always the case that the subject of a justi
fied belief is capable of determining the adequacy of his ground,
just by careful reflection on the matter, or, indeed, in any other
way." A weaker AI version falls prey to similar difficulties.14
What about sufficiency? Since the AI requirement is weaker than
the PI requirement, it is only necessary, says Alston, to show that
the PI requirement is not sufficient. The PI version of sufficiency
for adequacy states: "S's belief that p is based on an accessible
ground that S is justified in supposing to be adequate. "15 Does this
version ensure truth conducivity; what notion of justification is to
be used here? If it is not truth-conducive, the internalist moves
away from the goals of the epistemic point of view. But it is hard
to see that one can appeal to a truth-conducive notion without its
involving an externalist appeal. Perhaps one can shift the question
to a higher level, but that only weakens the demand momentarily;
at some level one must return to externalist requirements or lose
the epistemic point of view by appealing to non-truth-conducive
grounds. Thus, "in order for my belief that p, which is based on
ground G, to be justified, it is quite sufficient, as well as necessary,
that G be sufficiently indicative of the truth of p. It is in no way
required that I know anything, or be justified in believing any
thing, about this relationship. No doubt, we sometimes do have
justified beliefs about the adequacy of our grounds, and that is cer
tainly a good thing. But that is icing on the cake. " There is, then,
an externalist constraint on epistemic justification. 16
]eg is an evaluative concept, it does not require that beliefs be
within our direct control, it connects belief with the likelihood of
truth, it permits the grounds for belief to be within the subject's
cognitive states, and finally it allows for some "disagreement over
14. Alston, "An Internalist Externalism," pp. 239-40.
15. Ibid. , p. 242.
16. Ibid. , pp. 243-44.
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the precise conditions [ of justification] for one or another type of
belief. "17 Alston concludes that, since ]eg is the only candidate to
exhibit all these desiderata, it is clearly the winner for best candi
date for the notion of epistemic justification.

2.

The Justification of Reliability Claims

My concerns are the nature of epistemic justification and its con
nection to the reliability of epistemic practices and beliefs about the
reliability of epistemic practices. In the previous section I sketched
Alston's account of the former. Since Alston discusses the latter
issue in two different, albeit overlapping ways, it is best if the two
approaches are separated. In the remainder of this chapter I deal
with what I call Alston's "direct approach, " leaving the "doxastic
practice approach" for Chapter 5.
The direct approach is found in "Epistemic Circularity. " There
Alston claims both that one can be justified in reliability claims
about the procedures and mechanisms by which beliefs are gener
ated and that one can justify such reliability claims. In fact, he says,
since reliability claims are imbedded in every claim to justification,
"what it takes to justify a reliability claim will be at least part of
what it takes to justify a justification claim. "18 How does Alston
account for the justification of reliability claims? Relying on the
distinction between being justified in a belief p and justifying one's
belief that p, as well as on the notion that some epistemic practices
are basic epistemic practices, he argues that one can be justified in
reliability claims about practices by appeal to beliefs generated by
those practices. This argument involves a kind of circularity in rea
soning-what he calls "epistemic circularity" -but this is not a
logical circularity and the justification is not thereby vitiated.
Taking sense perception as an example of a source of belief, Al
ston suggests that its reliability cannot be established in a noncir
cular fashion. As he did in "Christian Experience and Christian
Belief, " he continues in "Epistemic Circularity" to call sense per
ception, as well as other epistemic practices (e.g., memory, intro
spection, and deductive and inductive reasoning), "basic practices";
17.
r8.

Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification, " p. I II.
Alston, "Epistemic Circularity," p. 322.
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these are basic sources of belief. He defines basic sources: "0 is an
(epistemologically) basic source of belief = df. Any (otherwise)
cogent argument for the reliability of 0 will use premises drawn
from 0. "19 If sense perception is a basic source or practice, then
one should expect to find the only means of justifying
reliability claims about the practice to be arguments containing
premises generated, at some point, by the practice itself.
Such arguments are not logically circular, on Alston's account of
logical circularity as he narrows down that notion. Logical circu
larity involves the conclusion of an argument figuring among the
premises. In epistemic circularity, however, what is at stake is not
the conclusion (such and such a source of belief is reliable) figuring
in the premises. Rather, it is that certain propositions which are
true and which are derived from the source shown reliable by the
argument are, in foct, from the source in question. The conclusion
itself does not appear in the premises. The issue is the epistemic
status of the premises. Alston's discussion hinges on the distinction
between being justified and the activity of justifying. The premises
are justified, but the conclusion still needs to be justified. Alston
gives the following example:20

(1) 1. At lt. S1 formed the perceptual belief thatpt. and p1•
2 . At t2. S2 formed the perceptual belief that p2, and p2•

Therefore, sense experience is a reliable source of belief.
Here a large number of perceptual beliefs are laid out, and each
belief is reported to be true. Supposing that 97 percent of the be
liefs were true, this inductive argument, says Alston, would allow
its user to become justified in the belief that sense experience is a
reliable source of belief. Of course, that sense experience is a reli
able source of belief nowhere shows up in the premises, for they
are only reports of the formation of sense beliefs and their truth.
But the reliability of sense perception is "practically assumed" by
19. Ibid. , p. 326.
20. Ibid. , p. 327·
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the premises. In using argument (1) to establish that sense percep
tion is reliable, one is already, implicitly or explicitly, taking sense
perception to be reliable. The need for this presupposition does not
result from syntactic or semantic considerations: it is a result of
neither the logical form of the argument nor the meaning of the
premises. It is, rather, the result of our epistemic situation as hu
mans. 21 It is an "epistemic presupposition, " and the circularity to
which it is tied is an "epistemic circularity. "
Arguments such as (I) can be used to justify the belief that sense
perception is reliable only if some principle of justification such as
(2) is true:22
(2)

If one believes that p on the basis of its sensorily appear
ing to one that p, and one has no overriding reasons to
the contrary, one is justified in believing that p.

All it takes to be justified in a perceptual belief, if (2) is true, is that
the belief come from one's experience in a certain way, given the
absence of overriding conditions militating against the truth of the
belief. One need not also be justified in accepting (2) or any related
or similar reliability principle. One does not have to be justified in
believing the conclusion of (I) in order for (I) to provide justifica
tion for one's belief in that conclusion. Thus (I) can be used to
justify one's belief that sense perception is reliable, if some princi
ple such as (2) is true. Furthermore, (I) continues to provide justi
fication even if one moves from implicitly assuming that sense per
ception is reliable to being explicitly aware that one is assuming it.
The force of the argument is not lost by one becoming more clear
about where the force lies, says Alston.
Such epistemically circular arguments cannot be used rationally
to produce conviction that sense perception (or any other belief
source) is reliable. One already has that conviction by practical as
sumption. Nor, says Alston, can one provide what he calls "full
reflective justification, " where he means that not only is a given
belief p shown to be justified but all other beliefs used in the justi
fication of p are shown to be justified. When a belief is fully reflec2 1 . Ibid., p. 328.
22. Ibid. , p. 3 3 r.
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tively justified, "no questions are left over as to whether the subject
is justified in accepting some premise that is used at some stage of
the justification. "23 There are limits on justification; one cannot jus
tify everything at once. To do so, or at least to attempt to do so,
does involve one in logical circularity. To demand full reflective
justification is to demand too much. To recognize the limitations
on our reasoning power is simply to recognize the humble state of
our epistemic situation. It does not commit one to the more radical
forms of skepticism.
Thus, according to Alston, not only can one justify one's belief
that a source is reliable but one can be justified in it. By way of
summary, it is worth quoting Alston at length:
We are interested not only in the prospects of an argument like [(r)]
being used to justify belief in [the reliability of sense perception], but
also in the prospects of one's being justified in believing [that sense
perception is reliable] by virtue of the reasons embodied in the
premises of [(r)]. The distinction being invoked here is that between
the activity ofjustifying a belief that p by producing some argument
forp, and the state of being justified in believing thatp. Of course one
way to get into that state is to justify one's belief by an argument.
We have already seen that this is possible with [(r)]. However, it is a
truism in epistemology that one may be justified in believing that p,
even on the basis of reasons, without having argued from those rea
sons top, and thus without having engaged in the activity ofjustify
ing the belief. Since we do not often engage in such activities we
would have precious few justified beliefs if this were not the case.
Indeed, we have exploited this possibility in claiming that one may
be justified in accepting the premises of [(r)] without having justified
them by argument. If the latter were required one would have to
appeal to [the claim that sense perception is reliable] as a premise,
and the enterprise of justifying [that sense perception is reliable]
would run into logical circularity. It even seems possible to be justi
fied, on the basis of reasons, in believing thatp without so much as
being able to produce an argument from those reasons top. It may
be that the reasons are too complex, too subtle, or otherwise too
deeply hidden (or the subject too inarticulate), for the subject to
recover and wield those reasons. 24

23. Ibid., p. 342.
24. Ibid. , pp. 334-35.
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Alstonian Justification Old and New

What relationships hold between the older accounts of Je, ]nw•
and Jns• on the one hand, and h and ]eg on the other? And what
results can we expect for the claims of "Christian Experience and
Christian Belief' and, in particular, the parity thesis, given the ar
guments of "Epistemic Circularity" and "Concepts of Epistemic
Justification"?
I do not think a detailed correlation between the older notions
from "Christian Experience and Christian Belief'-and the
newer-from the other essays I have considered-is easy to pro
vide. There are, however, some more or less general correlations.
For example, Jn is clearly the ancestor of ]d, since both are ex
plained in exactly the same terms. We can thus take Alston's con
cern in "Christian Experience and Christian Belief' to be the same
as that in "Epistemic Circularity" and "Concepts of Epistemic Jus
tification"; that is, we can work on the premise that the former
essay takes Jns and Jnw as accounts of justification which are in com
petition with ]eg· All are possible accounts of the justification of
beliefs from the epistemic point of view.
What follows from this alignment? First, the arguments showing
that ]di is not the best candidate for justification from the . epi
stemic point of view seem to apply equally well to Jnw· This point
does not, however, refute the argument of "Christian Experience
and Christian Belief." One might still be Jnw in holding a belief p
even though one does not have the best kind of epistemic justifica
tion. And Je may remain out of the believer's reach.
In the earlier work, however, Alston claims that one could never
have sufficient reasons for taking a practice or its deliverances to be
Je (even though they might be Je). He concludes there that, al
though PP and CP could both be Je, the best we can have is Jnw for
engaging in either of them. Thus Alston writes that, "if we are
to have any chance of acquiring knowledge, we must simply go
along with our natural reactions of trust with respect to at least
some basic sources of belief, provided we lack sufficient reason for
regarding them as unreliable."25 We must, that is, take Jnw as the
best we can do and trust that it will lead us to the right practices25. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 1 19.
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practices that are in fact Je· But why should we take Jnw beliefs and
practices to move us toward Je? Other than that we have nowhere
else to turn, Alston gives no reason in the earlier essay. He seems
to have shifted his position on this matter in "Epistemic Circu
larity, " however, for he argues that one can both justify a belief
that a practice is reliable and be justified in such a belief (even if one
has not attempted to justify it). And this is done, importantly, on
the basis of reasons.
If Alston is right in the claims of "Epistemic Circularity" and
"Concepts of Epistemic Justification, " then perhaps his claim in
"Christian Experience and Christian Belief' that one cannot be Jns
in engaging in a basic practice is incorrect. One can, according to
his later argument, have good reasons to engage in a basic practice,
even though those reasons are circular. And Alston himself says
that, "if I set out to discover whether a practice is Je, that is,
whether it is reliable, then I will also be investigating the question
of whether one could be Jns in engaging in that practice. "26 Once one
discovers that there are reasons to think the practice reliable and
that those reasons are one's own, then surely one finds not just that
one could be Jns in engaging in the practice but that one is Jns in
engaging in it, that is, unless Jns requires that the reasons for sup
posing a practice reliable be somehow outside the practice itself. It
is possible that Alston did think, at the writing of the earlier essay,
that the reasons must not be circular, that they must be outside the
practice. The whole notion of a practice being basic relies on the
presence of circularity in attempts at justification. But even if Al
ston did think that at an earlier time, he apparently became con
vinced that some kinds of circularity-such as epistemic circu
larity-are acceptable means to epistemic justification.
So it appears that one can be Jns in engaging in a basic practice
that is, that one has some reasons for taking a basic practice to be
reliable. And it is a clear inference from "Epistemic Circularity"
and "Concepts of Epistemic Justification" that one can be Jns in a
practice, at least as far as having reasons is concerned. What is not
clear is whether one has met the normative demands of Jns simply
by having reasons or whether some further conditions need to be
met. I suspect there are further conditions, but Alston does not
26. Ibid.,

p. II7.
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specify what they are. But even if he did, would it be worth find
ing out about those conditions if, in fact, normative or deontologi
cal accounts of justification do not give us what we desire in terms
of the epistemic point of view? If one could provide reasons for the
claim that a practice is reliable, would one not want to understand
those reasons as providing evaluative justification for the practice
rather than normative or deontological justification? I believe so.
The really important question, from the epistemic point of view, is
whether one can be }eg in a belief that a practice is reliable. I believe
Alston provides the structure that permits an affirmative reply to
this question.
How would the basic structure of arguments for a belief that
some practice is reliable look? Generalizing from Alston's example,
such an argument would rely on some principle such as this:
(3) If S believes that p on the basis of p's being delivered to S
by epistemic practice EP, and S has no overriding reasons
to the contrary, S is justified in believing that p.
Given the truth of (3), S can justifiably hold propositions such as
this:
(4) At t, S formed the EP belief that p, and p.
Now, S need not be justified in holding the epistemic principle (3).
Such a requirement would lead to logical circularity. But because
of that principle, S can be justified in holding propositions having
the same form as (4). But then S can string together propositions
in the form of (4) to produce an inductive argument to the conclu
sion that EP is reliable.
But what happens if the justification being demanded is of the }eg
type? Let us call the belief that some practice is reliable R. For S to
be }eg in believing R, it would have to be the case that S's believing
that R, as S does, is a good thing from the epistemic point of view,
in that S's belief that R is based on adequate grounds and S lacks
sufficient overriding reasons to the contrary. This is simply an ap
plication of Alston's general account of }eg· Let us assume that
there are no overriding conditions. Thus what is important is that
S have adequate grounds for believing R. According to Alston's
account, to have adequate grounds for a belief such as R, one need
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only have adequate (although epistemically circular) reasons. So let
us say that at t1 the practice in question generates belief Pt. at t2 it
generates p2, and so on. Suppose further that 97 percent of these
beliefs are true. S can thus conclude that the practice is reliable, and
hence S is justified in believing R.
Now, what we are after is whether this justification is the kind
specified by the account of ]eg· It is as long as inductive reasoning as a
source of belief is in fact reliable. Is it? One way to answer that ques
tion is to explore whether the belief that it is reliable is Jeg· But
one's initial justification of R does not rely on whether one has
justified the further belief that induction is reliable. One need only
be justified in that belief. So it appears that one can be ]eg in a belief
that a practice is reliable.
Not only can one be ]eg in the belief that the practice is reliable,
but by extension it seems that one can be ]eg in engaging in the
practice itself. Here is an account of Jeg applied to practices rather
than beliefs:
Grounds* Je (J�) S is J� in engaging in an epistemic prac
tice EP iff S's engaging in EP, as S does, is a good thing
from the epistemic point of view, in that S's engaging in
EP is based on adequate grounds and S lacks sufficient
overriding reasons to the contrary.
Here something needs to be said about the notion of adequate
grounds for engaging in an epistemic practice. Alston says that a
ground for a belief is "the sort of item on which a belief can be
based. " But basing a belief on a ground is not obviously the same
as basing one's engaging in a practice on a ground. Nevertheless,
perhaps it is enough if we piggyback the notion of grounds for
engaging in a practice on the grounds for a belief that that practice
is reliable. (Here we have a sufficient but perhaps not a necessary
condition for grounds for engaging in a practice. There may be
other ways of having grounds for engaging in a practice besides a
[ justified] belief that the practice is reliable. ) So, the sort of thing
that one can base one's engaging in a practice on is a belief that in
turn has grounds. Add to all this that these latter grounds are ade
quate and by extension that the grounds for engaging in a practice
are adequate. In the case under consideration, what would the ade-
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quate grounds be? Surely by Alston's own account, if one is justi
fied via an argument that rests on reliably formed beliefs (even if it
is epistemically circular) in the belief that the practice is reliable,
then one is justified in engaging in the practice. This all seems con
sonant with Alston's claim that "a particular belief is justified if and
only if we are justified in engaging in a certain epistemic practice. "Zl
Although this claim does not demand that one is justified in a belief
p if and only if one is justified in the second-order belief that the
practice that generates p is justified, my argument shows that one
can both justify and be justified in holding the second-order belief
and thus that engaging in the practice believed to be justified is
justified and hence that beliefs generated by the practice, such as p,
are justified. Although not required by his claim, the justification
of the second-order belief (in the reliability of the practice) seems
to show that one is justified in engaging in the practice and thus, to
borrow Alston's metaphor, is icing on the epistemological cake.
So it appears on this interpretation that one can be )eg in the
belief that a practice is reliable. By extension, one can be J� in
engaging in that practice. I noted above that the question of Jns
may be less important than "Christian Experience and Christian
Belief' suggests, given that we could have )eg for a practice. Nev
ertheless, it seems that one could also be Jns in engaging in a basic
practice. One already has the reasons needed. All that is required
beyond those reasons is whatever it takes to meet the normative
demands. Given that those are met, one could have Jns for the be
lief that a practice is reliable. Thus one could be Jns in engaging in a
practice and thus, according to Alston's own argument, one could
be Jns in engaging in PP. This is quite a different result from that
suggested in "Christian Experience and Christian Belief. " So, by
Alston's later arguments, one could be both J� and Jns in engaging
in PP, not only Jnw in so doing.
This conclusion raises several questions about PTA. Although
the original version may be true-both CP and PP may be Jnw
(here I am ignoring the background belief challenge)-much of
our interest in PTA derives from the supposition that neither PP
nor CP can do any better thanJnw· It appears that PP can do better,
by Alston's own argument. Now the question is whether CP can
27. Ibid.,

p. IIO.
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do as well. Can a person be Jtg or Jns in engaging in CP? Could
Alston suggest a new, and stronger, version of the parity thesis?
Let us consider Jtg, since Alston claims that its near relative, ]eg• is
the understanding of epistemic justification that has the most going
for it from the epistemic point of view. Might Alston suggest, for
example, the following:
Parity ThesisAlston Strong (PTAs): Under appropriate con
ditions, both S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP
are J1g.
Might he then continue by claiming that PTAs is true? PP, it has
been argued, can be Jtg. CP's having the same status rests on the
provision of reasons for the reliability of CP. Can such reasons be
given?
4·

A Challenge to Alston's Strong Parity Thesis

One challenge to PTAS can be seen if we return to the argument
presented above for the claim that one can be ]eg in believing that a
practice is reliable and apply it to the question of CP's reliability.
The resulting argument looks like this: for S to be ]eg. in believing
that CP is reliable, it would have to be the case that S's believing
that CP is reliable is a good thing from the epistemic point of
view, in that S's believing that CP is reliable is based on adequate
grounds and S lacks sufficient overriding reasons to the contrary.
Assuming that there are no overriding conditions, what would the
adequate grounds have to be for S's belief that CP is reliable to be
]eg? One needs adequate (albeit epistemically circular) reasons. So
let us say that CP produces beliefs p1, p2, p3, and so forth, and that
these beliefs (or a large percentage of them) are true. At this point
the argument appeals to induction to move from these beliefs to
the general belief that CP is reliable.
But here the argument runs afoul. With PP a large number of
beliefs are generated, literally tens of thousands, so that the induc
tive base for the general conclusion that PP is reliable is sufficiently
strong to support the conclusion. But one must wonder, just when
does an inductive argument become a strong one? How many be
liefs does one need in the inductive base? Is there a sufficiently large
base of beliefs generated by CP? In some cases perhaps there are,
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but one suspects that often the inductive base is not strong enough.
How often does the Christian believer employ CP (or how often
does CP work in her)? And does the believer trust her ability to use
CP well enough to trust its deliverances? These are important is
sues, but there are more pressing questions to ask.
First, it appears that any attempt to produce an overall justifica
tory argument for the reliability of a practice appeals to an induc
tive subargument; that is, the inductive subargument is essential to
the overall argument. No substitution is available. Second, the ap
peal to induction assumes that the belief-forming practice is some
thing we can test by applying it more than once. Third, the use of
induction rests on the assumption that the things about which the
induction is made are regular and predictive. Since the last two
points are intimately connected, I deal with them more or less to
gether.
Of the first point, let me say that Alston's subargument is an
inductive track-record argument. Is the inductive track-record sub
argument essential? The first point to make is that, even if it is not,
Alston's argument uses one. As far as the argument I have con
structed (and now criticize) follows Alston's reasoning, if my argu
ment is successful, I have at least shown that PTAs cannot be de
fended by that kind of argument. But then how could it be
defended? There needs to be some positive argument. Perhaps
there are other kinds of inductive arguments to which one might
appeal-an inference to the best explanation, for example. But the
points I make here about God's unpredictability seem to infect all
inductive subarguments, of the track-record variety or not. And so
I cast the following comments in general terms about induction.
What of noninductive arguments? It is hard to see what they
might be, in this case. To avoid logical (but allow epistemic) circu
larity, it is hard to see that any premise that allows a deductive
move to the needed conclusion is forthcoming. Alston begins with
a practical assumption of reliability, and this gets the argument off
the ground. But if one begins with practicality alone, one ends
with practicality alone if the logical moves are deductive. So it
looks as if an inductive subargument of some type is needed.
Induction is an epistemic practice in which we appeal to past
states of affairs and infer that these will continue into the future or
we appeal to the presence of certain qualities or properties in ob-
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jects and infer that these will be present in the future, and the like.
In other words, induction assumes that the objects with which
it deals do not change, at least radically, from one moment to
the next, or that the changes themselves are regularly repeating
changes, and that a good case can be made from the past into the
future. PP likewise deals with objects (or changes) that are regular
and predictive. It is natural, in fact, to link our practice of induc
tion to the practice of perception, understanding the two as rising
together in our cognitive past. Although not the same thing, in
duction and PP make similar assumptions about their subject mat
ters. The key assumption for our purposes is that the objects with
which they deal are predictable. Thus, since both PP and induction
work well in their dealings with the physical world, the appeal to
inductive principles to show the reliability of PP is both natural
and, it seems, legitimate. It is, as Alston admits, built into PP that
the objects that are its central concern are the kind of objects about
which predictions can be made. Predictions are likewise the heart
beat of induction. With these predictions we can anticipate and
control, to some extent, physical objects.
With CP, however, the connections with induction are much
less clear. If, for example, the applicability of induction to a set of
objects assumes that those objects do not change (in important
ways) over time, or that any changes are predictable, and yet God
does change (at least in unpredictable ways in his actions toward
us), of what use is an inductive argument to show that the practice
through which we have access to God-CP-is reliable? The issue
here is really one of the nature of the practice as well as of the
objects the practice supposedly accesses. With PP, the practice's
ostensible predictive nature cannot be separated from the ostensible
nature of the objects with which it deals. Of course one can safely
infer from the past activity of this or that physical object to its
future; that is part and parcel of the conceptual scheme of PP. On
the other hand, if the nature of the practice is so intimately tied to
the nature of its objects, and God is not predictable, then why
would CP be predictable? It is not, as Alston admits. But then in
what way can one appeal to an inductive argument to show that
CP is reliable? Unlike stones and trees, God is not predictable; we
cannot assume he will be or act in the future as he was or did in the
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past or that CP will give us access to him in the future as it has in
the past. God and his activities are not capable of being anticipated
or controlled. 28
Does this mean simply that one does not have, or at least that
one cannot count on, a large number of generated beliefs from
which to infer inductively a claim of reliability, as I suggested ear
lier? No, my suggestion here is stronger than that. I mean to say
that no induction from the past engagements of CP can be used
legitimately as an inductive base. It is part of the understanding of
the world that is embedded in CP (or in which CP is embedded)
that God does not have to give us any information. In fact, Alston
argues that, given the assumptions that God is somewhat myste
rious and that he has made us such that we cannot discern regu
larities in his nature and activities, then "if an epistemic practice
were to lead us to suppose that we had discovered regular patterns
in the divine behavior or that divine activity is equally discernible
by all, that would be a reason for regarding the practice as unreli
able. "29 If the assumption about the indiscernibility of regularity in
God's nature and activities is correct, then how could one safely
infer from the past deliverances of CP that it is reliable? And if the
inductive subargument is irreplaceable in the overall justificatory
argument, then a belief that CP is reliable cannot be justified by
that larger argument.
Alston has suggested in correspondence that my discussion does
not take into account that, whereas "induction concerns the rela
tions between beliefs and facts that make the beliefs true (where
they are true), what is unpredictable is the object the beliefs are
about. So that it is one thing that is unpredictable (God) and an
other thing that is the topic of the induction (truth about beliefs
28. There is a potential problem with this suggestion, since it is a mainstream
belief of Christians that God is constant and dependable. How is one to square the
(apparent) nonpredictability of God with his purported dependability and con
stancy? I do not know how to resolve this problem except to suggest that, even if
God is ultimately or finally dependable, nothing we know about him gives us
insight into how he will carry out this dependability. It does not, in short, seem
obviously contradictory to say that God is dependable but nonpredictable or that
he is faithful but full of surprises. My challenge deals only with the apparent ele
ment of surprise in God's ways of dealing with humanity.
29. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 1 29.
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about God when formed in a certain way). "30 This distinction is a
good one. Let us see how it affects my argument.
An inductive subargument for the reliability of CP, following
Alston's pattern, looks something like this:
(5)

1.
2.

At ft. S1 formed the CP belief that Pt. and p1.
At t2, S2 formed the CP belief that p2, and p2•

Therefore, CP is a reliable source of belief.
Alston's note calls attention to the fact that the basis for the induc
tion is the relationship between the conjuncts of the premises, and
the issue is not, therefore, one of predictability or nonpredic
tability. The move to the generalization is not based directly on the
facts about the object of the belief (in this case God) but on the fact
that the beliefs generated by CP are true. So it does not matter, for
the efficacy of the induction, whether the objects of the beliefs are
predictable or not.
Although I agree with Alston's basic point that the induction
itself is based on the relationship between the conjuncts of the
premises, there remains something curious about CP. This feature
of CP calls special attention to the object of the beliefs generated
by CP in an inductive argument supporting CP's reliability. PP is a
practice over which we have some control. If we do not wish to
form visual beliefs, we can close our eyes. If we do not wish to
form auditory beliefs, we can plug our ears. And so forth. Even
though we are constantly bombarded, during our waking hours,
with sensory information, there are certain measures we can take
to control how PP works with that information. The corollary to
this point is that generally the objects about which PP generates
beliefs are always present to us. They are constant and predictably
so. Thus we know what to do to engage in PP. We also know
perfectly well what it would be to use PP to generate beliefs and
then to reuse PP to validate those same beliefs. But it is less than
clear that we know the same about CP. Even if we do have beliefs
30. Personal letter dated November 26, 1 990.
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delivered to us by CP, it, unlike PP, is not the kind of practice we
can call up on demand. We cannot simply turn our head in the
right direction and use or apply CP. Having received some infor
mation by sight, I can return again to that spot and use sight to
validate the original belie( But what do I do having received the
information that God wants me to spend most of my time on
philosophical theology rather than other philosophical concerns?
How do I reuse CP to test that belief?
Perhaps there are certain things the Christian can do. For exam
ple, one subpractice of CP may be reading Scripture. Insofar as it
is, the Christian can pick up the Bible and read it, just as with PP
one can open one's eyes and look again. When we open our eyes
and turn our head in the right direction we can, more or less, trust
that our sight gives us the information needed to validate our ear
lier belief. But God need not reveal himself to us today when we
read the Scriptures, and thus the testability of CP lacks the kind of
repeatability of PP. And this brings us to my main reply to Al
ston's criticism. The objects of beliefs generated by PP do not do
anything to lead us to engage in PP. There is no conscious decision
or motivation on their part to initiate PP for us. This is not true
with CP. Presumably God must initiate CP. The unpredictability
of God, therefore, indicates that no inductive move from CP-gen
erated beliefs and their corresponding truth-making facts can pro
vide sufficient grounds for concluding that CP is reliable (or will
be reliable in the future). CP may work in entirely different ways
each times in operates. A lack of predictability on God's part does
lead to the failure of the inductive argument needed to show CP
reliable.
Furthermore, the predictability of the objects of PP beliefs is pre
cisely what makes the repeatability of our engaging in PP possible.
This repeatability allows for a kind of commitment to PP's re
liability that in turn gets the inductive argument going. Here I shift
to discuss the premises of Alston's argument, and hence it is Al
ston's "practical assumption" that is at stake. The move from the
generation of true perceptual beliefs (from experience and PP) to
the claim that PP is reliable depends on the practical assumption
that PP is reliable. This assumption must only be practical, of
course; otherwise one is involved in a logical rather than epistemic
circle. But how can one make even the practical assumption? We
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make it, I believe, because the deliverances of PP are so well con
firmed by the past predictive power of induction and PP. It is thi�
(predictive kind of) confirmation that "indicates" ("betokens, "
"manifests") PP's reliability in the first place. 31 But this confirma
tion is internal to the practice itself: induction seems either part and
parcel of PP or so intimately connected that one cannot engage in
induction without relying on PP (or other practices dealing with
predictable objects) and its internal assumptions. Thus one should
not view the (predictive) confirmation of the practice's deliverance�
as independent grounds or reasons for taking the practice to be
reliable. Nevertheless, confirmation may generate an initial trust in
the practice and hence the practical assumption is not irrational. I
am sure Alston would not take just any practice-let us say my
taking the pain in my knee to indicate that a Canadian hockey team
will take the Stanley Cup-as a practice one can practically assume
to be reliable. The presence of a reliability indicator is what sug
gests the practical assumption in the first place.
So, in addition to the move from the premises to the conclusion
relying on the predictive nature of the objects, the internal (predic
tive) confirmation of beliefs also depends on the regularity of the
objects over which the practice generating those beliefs ranges.
With CP such (predictive) confirmation appears not to be present.
The objects of the practice (God and his activities) are not regular
or predictable. Insofar as they are not, the practical assumption
does not seem plausible. There is no indicator of reliability to sug
gest that one make a practical assumption. So, although one need
not go on to show that induction itself is a reliable source of belief,
one must have an argument with a strong enough set of beliefs to
make a sound inductive move. CP appears to lack such a base, for
the practical assumption of CP's reliability does not have the net
work of confirmation that the related PP assumption has. Thus,
although PP is J�-one can generate an inductive, albeit episte
mically circular, argument for the reliability of PP-CP appears not
to be, since the requisite argument slips in some assumptions about
the nature of CP and its objects which are not true of that practice.
3 r . See Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief, " p. 1 25, for a full
explanation of these terms. See Chapter IO, and Mark S. MCLeod, "Can Belief in
God Be Confirmed?" Religious Studies 24 ( 1 988): 3 1 1-23, for further developmen1
of this and a nonpredictive kind of confirmation.
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I am suggesting, then, that although there may be an argument
justifying the belief that PP is reliable, insofar as that argument
rests on induction there can be no parallel argument for CP. There
are two points to my argument. First, because of the unpredictable
nature of the object of CP, one cannot go from the premises
(which contain truth claims about CP's deliverances) to the conclu
sion about CP's reliability. Second, not even the initial practical
assumption about CP's reliability is well founded, since, once
again, the nature of the object of CP does not allow for the internal
confirmatory platform that would lead one to make the practical
assumption in the first place. These two issues are connected, be
cause both rely on the unpredictability of God. So what suggests a
lack of force behind the practical assumption for CP turns out ulti
mately to challenge the move from the premises, even if true, to
the conclusion.
Does Alston have a response? He admits (and, in fact, makes
"epistemological hay out of') the fact that PP has confirmation and
predictive power whereas CP does not. On the basis of this kind of
observation, says Alston, some have rejected the reliability of CP.
He goes on to argue, however, that although confirmation and
predictive power are indicative of reliability, they are not necessary
for reliability. Can Alston use a related response against my sug
gestions, claiming, for example, that CP need not have confirma
tion and yet can still be legitimately practically assumed to be reli
able? I think not. It is true that a practice could be reliable and its
deliverances not be confirmed. Still, the argument under consid
eration, taken as a whole, relies on induction. Inductive arguments
can have success only where the base allows a predictive move
from the past to the future. With a well-confirmed base such
moves are plausible. As we have seen, this issue arises at two
stages, with the practical assumption and with the move from
premises to conclusion. With CP, however, the predictive applica
tion to future cases appears risky both with regard to the main
argument and with regard to the initial confirmation that might
suggest the practical assumption in the first place. The predictive
repeatability simply seems absent. What other reliability indicator
is available? None, and thus, insofar as Alston's argument requires
induction, we cannot make an appeal to the argument to show that
CP is Jfg. Alston's move earlier to ignore CP's lack of confirma-
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tion, and his subsequent claim that CP can be Jnw' does not rely on
an inductive argument. In fact, Jnw does not rely on argument at
all. In the case of Jnw' Alston's concern is with reasons against the
reliability of CP, and lacking confirmation and predictability does
not constitute a reason against reliability. But with J!g the case is
different, for now we are dealing with a lack of reasons for re
liability. J!g demands positive reasons and those simply are not,
and perhaps cannot be, provided by CP. So PTAS appears not to be
true.
Alston does say that CP has its own internal self-support. Does
this help him with PTAs? CP's self-support comes in terms of spir
itual development which, Alston suggests, is internal to the prac
tice. What is spiritual development?
CMP [CP], including the associated Christian scheme that has been
built up over the centuries, generates, among much else, the belief
that God has made certain promises of the destiny that awaits us if
we follow the way of life enjoined on us by Christ. We are told that
if we will turn from our sinful ways, reorder our priorities, take a
break from preoccupation with our self-centered aims long enough
to open ourselves to the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit, then
we will experience a transformation into the kind of nonpossessive,
nondefensive, loving, caring, and sincere persons God has destined
us to become.
This brief account does not do full justice to the notion of spiritual
development. Nevertheless, some Christians do develop in these
ways, and this provides some type of self-support for CP. Even so,
if we pay attention to the ways Christians treat their spiritual
development, we note that there is no predictive guarantee that
someone will mature as a Christian believer. Alston himself writes
that this development happens "not immediately and not without
many ups and downs. 32 This is no surprise, for we are dealing with
humans and their foibles, as well as with a God about whom even
believers are hesitant to predict things. And there is, of course,
much more to be said here.
But the main point is that spiritual development is also un
predictable and that this indicates the unlikelihood that even an
32. Alston, Perceiving God, p. 252.
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inductive argument bolstered with spiritual development as inter
nal support can be used to move one to a justified belief in re
liability.
Since the inductive argument is so prominent in the overall justi
ficatory argument, its absence effectively kills the justificatory ar
gument and hence the claim that one can be ]eg in a belief that CP
is reliable. Can one use the self-support of spiritual formation as an
indicator of reliability, that is, as enough for a practical assumption
of reliability? Perhaps, for spiritual development does occur among
those involved in CP, and there is a kind of confirmation that at
taches to CP because of the spiritual development of its practi
tioners. This is not a predictive kind of confirmation, however,
and an inductive argument based on it would be shaky at best. I
have more to say about the notion of a nonpredictive confirmation
in Chapters 10 and 1 1 , and I postpone detailed discussion until
then.
I believe it is safe to conclude that PTAs is false. What about the
Jns of CP? For the reasons presented against the ]eg of CP, its Jns
must be rejected as well. Thus although PP may be, according to
some of Alston's work, Jns• CP cannot be. And in the case of CP,
one cannot know that it is ]eg·
I have argued that some of Alston's more recent work militates
against the conclusions of his earlier work. A stronger parity thesis
emerges from this more recent work. But PT AS fails because of a
lack of inductive support for CP's reliability. There is one final
consideration that raises serious questions about PT AS· I turn to
explore Alston's doxastic practice approach to epistemology in the
next chapter.

